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Erosion of the Strict Scrutiny
Standard as Applied to Resident Aliens:
Foley v. Connelie
98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978)
Edmund Foley, a citizen of Ireland and resident alien 1 lawfully
within the United States, applied for appointment as a New York
state trooper but was denied permission to take the competitive ser-
vice examination pursuant to a state law making United States citi-
zenship a prerequisite to such employment. 2 Foley brought a class
action suit contesting the statute on the ground that it violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 and asking
for a declaratory judgment on its constitutionality.4 The three judge
federal district court relied on an alleged conflicts of interest problem
in the non-citizen officer's performance of certain specified duties 5
and granted the state's motion for summary judgment. In upholding
the statute, the court found the state to have a "substantial and com-
pelling interest" 6 in requiring its state troopers to be United States
1. The term "'resident alien" means any noncitizen "'lawfully admitted" to the
United States for permanent residency under the immigration and naturalization proce-
dures specified by federal statute. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1255(a) (1970). The term
"alien" refers to any person not a citizen or national of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) (1970). For the purposes of this article the two terms will be used inter-
changeably.
2. N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977), which states, "No person
shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of
the United States ...."
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall ...deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. Foley v. Connelie, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
5. The possibility of conflict arose, as stated by the Court, from the obligations
of a New York state trooper "to make arrests of violators of the federal immigration
laws, to participate in the Governor's Detail which provides protection for the Gov-
ernor and visiting foreign dignitaries, to conduct investigations into matters having to
do with government security, and to provide security at events involving foreign
visitors .... " Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 98
S. Ct. 1067. No finding was made by the district court, however, as to why aliens
would not perform these functions as competently as citizens. Instead, it chose to
rely on the state's assertion that these duties would conflict with the alien's primary
loyalty to the country of his nationality.
6. The state argued its interest to be, "the maintenance of public order to effect
the preservation of the political structure including the prevention, detection, and
prosecution of crime." Id. at 898.
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citizens. On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court, held,
affirmed: A State may, in its discretion, require citizenship as a qual-
ification for certain "'important nonelective executive, legislative, and
judicial positions' held by 'officers who participate directly in the for-
mulation, execution, or review of broad public policy"' 7 of which the
occupation of state trooper is one. Such state choices will only be
scrutinized by the Court to determine whether the citizen-alien dis-
tinction made bears some rational relationship to the state interest
sought to be protected.8 Foley v. Connelie, 98 S.Ct. 1067 (1978).
Discriminatory legislation against aliens is a comparatively recent
development in the history of the United States. All of the original
thirteen states permitted aliens to vote 9 and this right was written
into the laws and constitutions of twenty-two states and territories
during the nineteenth century.' 0 The first statutory limitation on
immigration was not passed by Congress until 1875; it provided for
the exclusion of convicts and prostitutes from the United States. 1 '
More general exclusion acts, including those refusing entry to
foreigners on the basis of nationality, were passed by Congress
shortly thereafter. 1 2  States which had granted voting rights to aliens
began to withdraw the privilege in 1848, with Arkansas the last to do
so in 1926 .13 This trend towards withdrawal of alien rights and set-
ting of more stringent controls on alien employment was primarily
motivated by rapid industrialization, an increasing scarcity of jobs,
and the high percentage of noncitizens claiming those jobs.14  With
7. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973), cited in, Foley v. Connelie,
98 S. Ct. at 1071.
8. Id. at 4240.
9. See generally Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 172-73 (1874).
10. M. KONVTTZ, THE ALIEN AND ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 1 (1946).
11. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
12. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (denying entry to Chinese
laborers for a period of ten years; this act was renewed in 1892). See also Act of
March 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115; Act
of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, 25 Stat. 476.
13. D. McGOVNEY, THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE MEDLEY 49 (1949).
14. The situation in this country at the time was described by one author as
follows:
By the early twentieth century the foreign-born formed the mass of
the wage-earners in every area where manufacturing or mining was prac-
ticed. They were to be found in the textile factories of New England, in
the mines, mills and factories of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York,
in the coal mines and factories of the Middle West, and in the iron ore
and copper mines of Michigan and Minnesota. In 1910 the Dillingham
Commission reported that in the twenty-one industries it studied, 57.9 per
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the Depression came the reservation of more and more occupations
for United States citizens and the concurrent disqualification of aliens,
by states, for the same occupations.' 5
In 1886, the Fourteenth Amendment was made applicable to
aliens as well as citizens in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
16 where
the Supreme Court struck down a San Francisco ordinance making it
unlawful for any person to maintain a laundry in a wooden building,
because of a purported fire hazard. Although neutral on its face, the
statute was enforced by authorities almost exclusively against Chinese
members of the community. The Court, citing the equal protection
clause, declared: "These provisions are universal in their application
to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 1
7  The door
was thus opened to the initiation of two basic constitutional doctrines:
(1) that the Fourteenth Amendment protection is not limited to citi-
zens, and (2) while a statute may be legitimate on its face, the Court
may still invalidate it if, in purpose and effect, it is discriminatory
against any class."'
cent of all employees were foreign-born .... In some industries, such as
clothing manufacture, textiles, coal mining, and slaughtering and meat-
packing, the proportion was even higher. In railroad and construction
work, too, the Commission found a similar preponderance of the foreign-
born.
M. ALLEN JONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 218 (1960).
15. On the nature of such discrimination, one commentator wrote:
In the United States a condition exists wherein three out of every five
jobs are closed to aliens, where four out of every five memberships in
labour unions are open to citizens only, and where innumerable laws in
each state deter an alien from entering many occupations. Such a condi-
tion, when imposed on an alien, results in a tendency to immigrate back
home.
H. FIELDS, 26 CLOSING IMMIGRATION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 674-75 (1932). For
in depth studies beyond the scope of this article as to restrictions on alien employ-
ment, see generally Chin, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination,
45 FORDUAM L. REV. 835 (1977); Das, Discrimination in Employment Against
Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution and Federal Civil Rights Laws, 35 U. PITT.
L. REV. 499 (1974). See also note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to
Work, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1012 (1957).
16. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17, Id. at 369.
18. Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLUM.
L. REV, 1012, 1024 (1957).
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Twenty years later, in Truax V. Raich, 19 the Court expanded the
protection of aliens to include the right to work for a living in the
"common occupations of the community." On petition of an alien
employee, the Court invalidated a state statute making it illegal for
employers to employ aliens as more than twenty percent of their
work force, reasoning that, without the ability to work, "the prohibi-
tion of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws
would be a barren form of words." 20  Although recognizing a Con-
stitutional right of aliens to employment, the Court, however, found
such right to be limited in scope.
In dictum, it legitimized the state's power to make reasonable
legislative classifications promoting the public health, safety, morals,
and welfare. Thus, it determined that if the state could show that the
employment of aliens in a particular business would endanger the
public, and that the state therefore had a special interest in the res-
ervation of such employment to citizens, the special state interest
would be recognized. 2 1 The immediate result of this dictum was the
advancement of several "special interest" theories to sustain dis-
criminatory legislation. These were: (1) A state's proprietary interest
in either the subject matter of the occupation, 2 2 or (2) the occupation
19. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). Although couched in equal protection language, the deci-
sion was based on a finding that the state law conflicted with the federal policy
governing immigration and naturalization, and was therefore violative of the Suprem-
acy clause. However, this case laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions with the
Court's declaration:
The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earn-
ing a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount
to the assertion of the right to. deny them entrance and abode, for in
ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work. And, if such a
policy were permissible, the practical result would be that those lawfully
admitted to the country under the authority of acts of Congress, instead of
enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges confer-
red by the admission, would be segregated in such of the states as chose
to offer hospitality.
Id. at 42.
20. Id. at 41. While the Court did not attempt. to define with -precision what
common occupations of the community" were, it appears to have been concerned
with ordinary private enterprise, for which a state could have no legitimate reason in
prohibiting aliens.
21. Id.
22. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (hunting game within the state's
boundaries). But see Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
(rejecting the contention that a state's ownership within commercial fishing bound-
aries is sufficient reason to discriminate against resident aliens).
itself,23 or (3) a state's police power, by which it could deny employ-
ment to aliens in those occupations it deemed so hazardous that it
could prohibit the occupation altogether.
24
The reversal of this trend was precipitated by the footnote in
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 25 in which Justice Stone
suggested, "(P)rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry." 26  One derivative of this inquiry, termed the "new
equal protection",2 7 consists of judicial intervention in the protection
of individual choice whenever state action abridges those rights
judged to be "fundamental" 28 or a state enacts legislation regarding
23. Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (practice of law). Contra, In re Grif
fiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff'd sub
noma., Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915)
(employment on public works projects). See Sugarman v. Dougall, supra note 7.
24. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (pawnbrokers); Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927) (denial of license to operate a pool and billiard hall); Trageser v.
Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905 (1890) (sale of liquor); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195
Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (hawking and peddling); Wright v. May, 127 Minn.
150, 149 N.W. 9 (1914) (auctioneering); Miller v. City of Niagara Falls, 207 App.
Div. 798, 202 N.YS. 549 (1924) (sale of soft drinks prohibited aliens because of a
possibility of contamination); Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359 (1922)
(motorbus operators). Some courts equated the character of the alien and his treat-
ment in law with that of a convicted felon in order to justify the discrimination:
It cannot be assumed that the legislature did not have evidence be-
fore it, or that it did not have reasonable grounds to justify the legislation,
as, for instance, that unnaturalized foreign-born persons and persons who
have been convicted of a felony were more likely than citizens to unlaw-
fully use firearms or engage in dangerous practices against the government
in times of peace or war, or to resort to force in defiance of the law. To
provide against such contingencies would plainly constitute a reasonable
exercise of the police power.
Ex parte Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 650, 226 P. 914 (1924).
25. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
26. Id.
27. Analysis under the new equal protection is divided into a rigid two tier ap-
proach which is often determinative of results-"strict-scrutiny invalidation" and
'minimal scrutiny-non-intervention." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L.
REV. 1 (1972). For an analysis of the doctrine and its applicability to aliens, see
generally note Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination Against
Aliens, 16 VA. J. INT'LL. 355 (1976).
28. The rights held to be fundamental by the Supreme Court are, to date, very
few in number. They are: procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); voting, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
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certain "suspect classifications" 29 and cannot justify those actions in
terms of a "compelling state interest." 30  Statutes which do not in-
fringe a fundamental right or do not involve a suspect classification
are judged under the more deferential "rational basis" test. 31
The initiation of more stringent guidelines for judicial review of
alien-citizen distinctions, in accord with Carolene Products, caine
with the 1971 decision of Graham v. Richardson 32 which termed
alienage a "suspect classification." Much to the surprise of Constitu-
tional scholars, this decision was made, not by the liberal Warren
Court, but by the more philisophically conservative Burger Court. In
Graham, the Supreme Court unanimously held unconstitutional an
Arizona law which conditioned the receipt of state welfare benefits on
United States citizenship, declaring for the first time that classifica-
tions based on alienage were "IiInherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny." 33  The Court quickly followed Graham with
the invalidation of state statutes making citizenship a prerequisite to
employment by the state civil service, 34 acceptance to the state bar
association, 35 private practice as a civil engineer, 36 and the receipt of
access to the criminal process, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); privacy, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and right of interstate travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
29. Suspect classifications are, as follows: race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); national origin, Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971). Classes such as sex, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); illegitimacy, Trim-
ble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), and wealth, San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), have been suggested to the Court, and though re-
jected, may have initiated a third, middle level of scrutiny for those classes on the
periphery, although not quite suspect.
30. The standard demanded as a result of Carolene Products and subsequent de-
cisions is much more difficult to meet than the showing of any rational reason. The
state must assert a state interest so compelling as to warrant discrimination.
31. The deferential nature of this test is apparent from the decision in McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) where Chief Justice Warren stated:
Thie constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequal-
ity. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Prior to the Carolene Products footnote, this was the primary standard used for re-
viewing discriminatory treatment of aliens-a standard which led to minimal inter-
ventionism by the Court.
32. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
33. 403 U S. at 372.
34. Sugarman v, Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648.
35. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
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state financial aid to higher education. 37  In all of these cases, the
Court required the state to show a compelling interest justifying the
distinction and, when none was forthcoming, overturned the legisla-
tion. Following the Graham guidelines, state and federal courts in-
validated even more state legislation. 38 Those decisions applied the
equal protection clause to forbid such discrimination, premised on the
assumption that aliens were entitled to some, if not all, of the rights
of citizens because, "[l]ike citizens, (they) pay taxes, support the
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other
ways to our society." 3 9
The courts have not, however, held the Fourteenth Amendment
to indicate blanket equal treatment in every instance. The right to
vote,40 hold public office, 4 1 and serve on petit or grand juries, 42 are
those reserved to citizens, who are participants in the political pro-
cess. In Sugarman v. Dougall,43 the Court prescribed a limited ex-
ception from strict scrutiny: the power to determine the qualifications
of its officers, both elected and nonelected, is reserved to the states
by virtue of the Tenth Amendment, when those officials are "engaged
directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public pol-
icy, perform[ing] functions that go to the heart of representative gov-
ernment."
36. Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
37. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
38. Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1972) (participation in territorial
scholarship funds). Contra, Friedler v. Univ. of New York, 70 Misc. 2d 446, 333
N.Y.S.2d 928 (1972). Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D.Ariz. 1972) (employ-
ment as teacher or social service worker); Jen Cuk v. Brian, 355 F. Supp. 133 (N.D.
Cal. 1972) (health and medical aid); Mohamed v. Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mass.
1973) (municpal employment forbidden except as doctors or nurses); Lopez v. White
Plains Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (public housing eligi-
bility); Arias v. Examining Board of Refrigerator and Air Conditioning Technicians,
353 F. Supp. 857 (D.P.R. 1972) (limiting issuance of refrigeration and air-
conditioning technicians' licenses to citizens); Sailer v. Tonkin, 356 F. Supp. 72
(D.V.I. 1973) (conditioning compensation to victims of criminal acts on residency
status); Teitscheid v. Leopold, 342 F. Supp. 299 (D. Vt. 1971) (state employment);
Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar
Examiners, 7 Cal.3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (state bar associa-
tions); Herriott v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 (1972) (civil service
examination).
39. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 722.
40. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 648.
41. Id. at 648 n.13.
42. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974) (three judge court', aff'd
mer., 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
43. 413 U.S. at 647.
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In itself, this exclusion from state political processes is not un-
usual. Although there exists opinion to the extent that international
law obligates a nation to permit aliens lawfully within its jurisdiction
to pursue gainful employment, 4 4 there is substantial authority to the
contrary.4 5  Even those who contend that the right exists, explain
that it is exceptionally limited in scope; a state may still exclude
aliens from the exercise of enumerated professions and trades, as it
deems necessary. In doing so, a nation incurs no sanctions under in-
ternational law as long as the exclusion was not "patently arbitrary
and manifestly unreasonable." ' 46  The treatment accorded aliens in
the United States is unique in two respects: (1) the applicability of the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to aliens
within its jurisdiction 47 and (2) the broad guaranty of other rights to
aliens by the Constitution,4 8 and judicial interpretation of it. It is
therefore unusual, once the Supreme Court has established such
broad protection and declared distinctions based on alienage suspect,
to find it creating an exemption from strict scrutiny without spelling
out the nature of this exemption with specificity.
FOLEY V. CONNELIE: LIMITED EXEMPTION OR RETREAT?
Edmund Foley applied for and was refused permission to take
the New York competitive service examination to qualify for the
occupation of state trooper. He was denied this permission on the sole
ground that he was an alien and that his duties as a trooper would
conflict with the allegiance owed his country of nationality. In affirm-
44. W. GIBSON, ALIENS AND THE LAw 115-16 (1940).
45. A. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO
ALIENS 156-57 (1949).
46. GIBSON, supra note 44, at 16.
47. One critic has praised the Fourteenth Amendment as both a unique achieve-
ment and one desirable of emulation:
The absence of such beneficial provisions easily may lead to consider-
able hardship, to which the national state of the suffering alien is very
likely to react by discrimination against aliens within its own jurisdiction.
A better example of the fallacy of the so-often advocated principle of reci-
procity could hardly be found.
ROTH, supra note 45, at 157-58.
48. An alien has been held a "person" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process clause, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976), and cannot be deprived of
his property, in times of peace, without just compensation, Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). Finally, the common law rule barring suits by
aliens has been abrogated by judicial decision, Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942).
1056
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ing New York's right to exclude Foley from the position, the Su-
preme Court barely made reference to In re Griffiths,49 a completely
analogous decision of five years earlier in which the Court rejected
similar state-proferred arguments and reiterated that distinctions
based on alienage were inherently suspect. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority in Griffiths, held that there was no compelling state in-
terest which would legitimize Connecticut's requirement that all
members of the state bar association be citizens. He took recognition
of the fact that an attorney's role as an "officer of the court" has tradi-
tionally been considered one close to the process of government, but
rejected, as without merit, the state's contention, inter alia, that,
because of his alien status, an attorney might ignore his responsi-
bilities. Powell took the position"0 that "a lawyer's high responsibili-
ties . . . hardly involve matters of state policy or acts of such unique
responsibility to entrust them only to citizens." 51  Only two mem-
bers of the Court dissented, 52 despite the fact that, in Connecticut, a
member of the bar has a rather unique status; he is a commissioner of
the superior court with the authority, per statute, to sign writs, issue
subpoenas, take recognizances and administer oaths, and by virtue of
his position can even command sheriffs to issue orders "by authority
of the State of Connecticut." 53
In Foley, the Court skirted the issues raised in Griffiths, distin-
guishing the case on the basis that the profession of attorney was one
of the "common occupations of the community," appointment to
which an alien could not be refused without a substantial governmen-
tal reason. 54 The Court appears to have equated those "common oc-
vcupations" with functions performed by "private person(s) engaged in
routine public employment" 55 and made the determination of which
49. 413 U.S. 717.
50. Chief Justice Burger disagreed so strongly with the majority that, in dissent,
he recommended to the states that they adopt statutes allowing alien admission to
the bar only if the aliens came from countries practicing reciprocity. Together with
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, he accused the Court of denigrating the process of acquiring
citizenship by rendering it meaningless. 413 U.S. at 733.
51. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724.
52. justices Burger and Rehnquist. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Jus-
tice Powell.
53. In re Griffiths, 162 Conn. 249, 252, 294 A.2d 281, 284 (1972).
54. 98 S. Ct. at 1070. The Court wrote, "These exclusions struck at the nonciti-
zens' ability to exist in the community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence." Id.
55. Id. at 1072.
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analytical standard to use dependent on the amount of power exer-
cised by the official over the public. 56 The validity of this distinction
is questionable since an attorney, especially when granted the broad
range of powers as those in Griffiths, must deal with the public and
exercise a great deal of discretion in doing so. Moreover, there is
more of a similarity between the functions of an officer and an attor-
ney, which are both permanent means of earning a living, than be-
tween the former and the position of juror (an analogy the Foley
Court made) which is only temporary in nature.
The Court's failure to either follow or adequately distinguish
previous cases based on the strict scrutiny standard is an indication of
its growing hesitance to use categorical distinctions. Recently, in in-
validating discriminatory state legislation, the Burger Court has used
an approach markedly different from the traditional minimum ration-
ality test 57 or even that of "strict scrutiny" which it purports to fol-
low. Gunther 5" terms this approach "minimum rationality with bite"
because, he argues, it allows the Court to use the equal protection
clause as an "interventionist tool" while still being able to avoid the
strict scrutiny language of the new equal protection, thereby avoiding
the appearance of intervening. 59 An examination of Foley and the
line of cases preceding it shows the inclination of at least four mem-
bers of the Court towards this standard of review and away from the
strict scrutiny standard in alienage cases.
60
56. Id.
57. The traditional "minimum rationality" test grants a large range of deference to
the political process, and in actuality, results in little, if any, judicial interference
with legislative policy choices because:
A decision to aid artists rather than oilmen is defensible in terms of
promoting the arts; punishing battery more harshly than burglary is defen-
sible in terms of the safe-guarding of physical security. And so is any
choice thus defensible, because the courts are prepared to credit as ac-
ceptable any goal the political branches view as contributing to the general
welfare. Thus each choice will import its own goal ... and the require-
ment of a "rational" choice-goal relation will be satisfied by the very mak-
ing of the choice.
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 70 YALE L.J.
1205, 1247 (1970). See also note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protec-
tion, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
58. Gunther, supra note 26, at 18-19.
59. Id.
60. In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977), Justice Powell dissented, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart. The Chief Justice also joined Mr.
Justice Rehnquist in a separate opinion, dissenting.
1058
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The position of Justice Rehnquist is exemplified by his combined
dissenting opinion in Sugarman and Griffiths. Rehnquist protests that
the distinction between citizens and aliens is one recognized in both
the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment itself. He opposes
any attempt to enlarge the theory of "suspect classifications" to en-
compass more than race. 61 His dissents are reminiscent of Supreme
Court decisions of half a century ago in that they focus on the powers
of the state to enact such legislation rather than on a concern for
individuals, "persons" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, who are unable to work to support themselves in their
chosen fields. Moreover, he insists that since aliens have the means
of becoming naturalized they must "follow the prescribed procedures
before (they) can become 'one of us' and share the benefits that citi-
zens enjoy." 62 In Nyquist v. Mauclet,6 3 Mr. Justice Rehnquist made
a revealing comment on the issue:
I am troubled by the somewhat mechanical application of the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence to this case. I think one can
accept the premise of Graham (citations omitted) and therefore
agree with the Court that classifications based on alienage are
inherently suspect but nonetheless feel that this case is wrongly
decided ....
Here, unlike with the other cases, the resident alien is not a
member of a discrete and insular minority for purposes of the clas-
sification even during the period that he must remain an alien,
because he has at all times the means to remove himself im-
mediately from the disfavored classification.6
Despite language couched in the terminology of close judicial
scrutiny, these passages suggest uncertainty as to the premise on
which all prior decisions were based. The dissent, led by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist, intimated that there is a paradox in treating alienage as a
classification "inherently suspect" because members of the class, un-
like the members of classes based on immutable characteristics, such
as race, national origin, sex, or illegitimacy, can change their status
voluntarily and so move out of the class.
61. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 660.
62. Comment, Aliens, Employment, and Equal Protection, 19 VILL. L. REv. 589,
603 n.116 (1974).
63. 432 U.S. at 10.
64. Id. at 20.
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This uncertainty as to the appropriate standard of judicial review
to use when dealing with alienage culminates in the Foley decision.
In a footnote, the Court, per Chief Justice Burger, recognizes that,
because of its decision, many naturalized citizens will be precluded
from becoming New York state troopers since the process of natural-
ization takes five years and the New York police force has a fixed age
requirement. 65 Nonetheless, the Court articulates that a distinction
must of necessity be drawn between citizens and aliens when the
latter indicate a desire to participate in the political process in which
they have no voice. In doing so, the Court purports to rely on the
Sugarman exception to the strict scrutiny rule. 66  Burger writes that
it would be inappropriate for the Court to require the state to meet
the heavy burden of close judicial scrutiny in every instance because
"to do so 'would obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and
aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship."' 67 Ar-
guably, the Court's opinion has done more than carve out and rede-
fine a narrow exception to the close scrutiny.68 In lowering the stan-
dard for the state to meet, the Court legitimizes the distinction,
heretofore rejected, 69 between citizens and aliens in public service
positions. The Court fails to recognize that the history granting ben-
efits based on United States citizenship is relatively short and, in em-
phasizing that citizenship must "mean something" the Court thereby
skirts the issue of which characteristics make aliens ineligible for
those positions.7 0  Moreover, although the majority opinion attempts
to distinguish its prior decision in Griffiths, both concurring and dis-
senting opinions argue it cannot be done.
7 '
65. 98 S. Ct. at 1069 n.l.
66. Id. at 1070.
67. Id.
68. The Court attemts to keep its holding within the narrow confines of the
Sugarman dictum, "The essence of our holdings to date is that although we extend
the aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with the ability to earn a
livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the right to govern is reserved to citi-
zens." Id. at 1071.
69. These distinctions were rejected not only by the Supreme Court in Criffiths
and Sugarman, but also in several state court decisions, the most noteworthy of
which are, Purday & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal.2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1969) (en bane), and Rafaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal.3d 288, 496
P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). In these cases, the California Supreme Court
rejected many of the same arguments made by the Court in Foley.
70. At least Mr. Justice Stevens, together with Justice Brennan, accuses the
Court of doing so in dissent.
71. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart states that he would be unable
to reconcile the Court's opinion in Foley with the Court's prior decisions had he not
recapitulated his old position. Justice Blackmun's concurrence is noticeably
narrower-he relies on the limitations intimated in Sugarman to conclude with the
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If this case signifies a Supreme Court retreat in the area of equal
protection, what are the judicially enforceable standards to which
lower courts may look for guidance? Arguably, the opinion evidences
a lack of precision and clarity in establishing these. In dissent, Justice
Marshall criticizes the absence of guidelines and attempts to formu-
late his own. Marshall emphasizes that the exemption in Sugarman is
a narrow one, necessarily limited to those officials who have "respon-
sibility for actually setting government policy pursuant to a delegation
of substantial authority from the legislature." 7 2  Marshall also distin-
guishes between those positions involved with the formulation of pub-
lic policy, and those which are further removed from the political
process, having only to do with its execution. 73  He concludes that
the former only are exempted by Sugarman, and that the job of a
state trooper is by nature one of the latter category, and subject to
close judicial scrutiny. Marshall is able to reach this conclusion by an
examination of New York statutory and case law 74 which authorizes
citizens of the community to exercise the same discretionary powers
as policemen under certain circumstances, thereby countering the
majority's exemption of state troopers because of their "authority to
exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers." 75
A somewhat different approach is taken by Mr. Justice Ste-
vens. 7 6  He first attempts to define the reason for and nature of the
unfavorable treatment of aliens within states, surmising, "Aliens do
not vote. Aliens and their families were therefore unlikely to have
been beneficiaries of the patronage system which controlled access to
Court that the activities of state troopers are "basic to the function of state govern-
ment." Foley, 98 S. Ct. at 1074. This is important in light of the fact that Blackmun
wrote the majority opinion in three of the major alienage decisions: Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572 (1976), and Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). In light of this concur-
rence, Justices Blackmun may very well be the swing vote on the Court in the future.
In dissent, Justices Stevens and Brennan agree with Stewart that the Foley opinion
may serve to repudiate Griffiths.
72. 98 S. Ct. at 1075.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1076. N.Y. CIM. PRoc. LAw § 140.30 (McKinney 1972) which reads,
"[Any person may arrest another person (a) for a felony, and (b) for any offense when
the latter has in fact committed an offense in his presence." The New York case law
relied on establishes that, under these specified circumstances, private individuals
can make a lawful search incident to arrest. United States v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d
1977 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Rosse, 418 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963).
75, 98 S. Ct. at 1071.
76. Dissenting together with Mr. Justice Brennan. Id. at 1076-79.
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public employment during so much of our history." 7 7 Such reasons,
he concludes, may explain but do not justify discriminatory treat-
ment. Stevens, like Marshall, is concerned with the standards the
Court has used, writing that it should, "draw the line between
policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions in as consistent and in-
telligible a fashion as possible;" 78 the result of its failure to do so,
evident in Foley, is that "inexplicably, every state trooper is trans-
formed into a high ranking, policymaking official." 79  Stevens makes
a distinction between the formulation of public policy, which is "the
essence of individual citizenship" 80 giving "dramatic meaning to the
naturalization ceremony,""' and its execution, which has already
been allowed aliens, and from which they cannot now be excluded
"'without a good and relevant reason."82 Yet Stevens's real
disagreement with the Court is that it does not attempt to answer
fundamental questions raised by an opinion which, at the least, is
inconsistent with those directly preceding it. He concludes:
Even if the Court rejects this analysis, it should not uphold a
statutory discrimination against aliens, as a class, without expressly
identifying the group characteristic that justifies the discrimination.
If the unarticulated characteristic is concern about possible disloy-
alty, it must equally disqualify aliens from the practice of law, yet
the Court does not question the continuing vitality of its decision
in Griffiths. Or if that characteristic is the fact that aliens do not
participate in our democratic decision making process, it is irrele-
vant to eligibility for this category of public service. If there is no
group characteristic that explains the discrimination, one can only
conclude that it is without any justification that has not already
been rejected by the Court.83
The reasoning of Mr. Justice Stevens was followed recently by a
three judge federal district court in California in striking down a state
statute making citizenship a prerequisite to employment in any gov-
77. Id. at 1077.





83. Id. at 1078-79. The questions asked by Stevens remain unanswered by the
Court, "If the integrity of all aliens is suspect, why may not a State deny aliens the
right to practice law? Are untrustworthy or disloyal lawyers more tolerable than un-
trustworthy or disloyal policemen? Or is the legal profession better able to detect
such characteristics on an individual basis than is the police department?" id. at
1077.
ernment position declared by law to be a peace officer.8 4  The court
noted that each of the three plaintiffs was willing to take the loyalty
oath prescribed in the California constitution, which included an
agreement to support and defend the federal and state constitu-
tions.8 5 It read the references to a "political community" in Sugar-
man, for which the state might prescribe citizenship, as being "con-
fined to high policy making officers." 86  If, as has been stated, "it is
the indiscriminate denial of a spectrum of jobs which Dougall pro-
hibits," 7 this case is certainly more consistent in achieving those
ends than in Foley. The opinion is noteworthy in that the Court
explicity rejected the State's ability to define its own political com-
munity as a compelling interest. The decision in Foley, on the other
hand, evinces an erosion of the strict scrutiny standard as applied to
aliens. It does so by failing to discuss why aliens would be less fit for
appointment as state troopers and by failing to address viable alterna-
tives to the statutory scheme. 88
With respect to laws discriminating against aliens, there is little
if any scope for the application of deference towards legislative acts.
An alien cannot be compelled to show and prove that discrimination
against him is unreasonable, for in doing so he would have to prove
the negative-that there is no correlation between his exclusion from
employment and the public welfare-an almost impossible task. In-
stead, the burden should lie with the State in attempting to close its
doors to him. 8 9 The Supreme Court's decisions in Sugarman and
84. Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), appeal filed sub
norn., Los Angeles County v. Chavez-Salido, 45 U.S.L.W. 2388 (U.S. May 17, 1977)
(No. 76-1616).
85. Id. at 161.
86. Id. at 170.
87. Comment, supra note 62, at 604.
88. Besides the citizenship requirement, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1977) provides that persons appointed to the police force must have "fitness
and good moral character" and must have passed physical and mental examinations.
Appointments are made for a probationary period of one year, and it is only after
satisfactory completion of the probationary period that the appointment is considered
permanent. Thus, if the alien is unfit for the position at issue, there are procedures
which would reveal it on an individualized basis.
89. Emphasizing the state's burden in such cases, Konvitz wrote,
Courts should face realistically the fact known to everyone that laws
are frequently enacted because pressure groups want them; and pressure
groups want discrimination against the alien because they would be more
comfortable (or so they assume) without his competition. The alien is
without remedy except in the courts; the courts should, therefore, afford
him a measure of relief equal to the handicaps under which he lives,
M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND THE AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 181 (1946).
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Griffiths recognized the inequity in forcing an alien to prove his own
competency. Its recent decision in Foley shows a departure from
those standards. The Court fails to explain why the "cloak of author-
ity" singles out a state trooper for exemption from the strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review. 90 nor does it successfully explain why this
officer is closer to the political process than is an attorney. 91 Apart
from asserted "political aspects" in the occupation of a state trooper,
there is little connection between alienage and the performance of an
officer's duties. It has yet to be demonstrated that citizenship has an
effect on the ability of an individual to detect or prosecute crime.
The Foley opinion threatens the status of alienage as a suspect
class, and with it, the progressive attitude of the United States, offer-
ing more protection to persons within its jurisdiction than any coun-
try in the world.9 2 It marks a return to the incompetency-criminality
decisions of fifty years ago which created an almost irrebutable pre-
sumption of ineptitude and untrustworthiness on the part of the
alien. 93  The Supreme Court itself has already recognized that citi-
zenship has "no particular or rational relationship to skill, compe-
tence, or financial responsibility." 94  Moreover, the absence of care-
fully drawn, judicially manageable standards may pose further prob-
lems for the Court in the near future, 9 5 for at least one justice has
90. The Court merely relies on the discretionary nature of a state trooper's duties
in making arrests and searches, which, in light of Justice Marshall's dissent is ques-
tionable.
91. Although the Court rejected citizenship as a qualification for the profession of
attorney in Griffiths, it affirmed the right to exclude aliens from jury service. Perkins
v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D.Mc. 1974) (three judge court), aff'd msem., 426 U.S.
913 (1976). It does not indicate what quality makes a state trooper more similar to a
juror than he is to an attorney.
92. A. ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO
ALIENS 156-58 (1949).
93. "It is common knowledge that several million aliens are living in this country
and that the vast majority are peaceful and law-abiding .... (A) person does not
demonstrate instability, nor does he show a tendency towards crime, simply because
he is not a citizen of this country." Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal.3d
288, 298, 496 P.2d 1264, 1271, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896, 903 (1972).
94. Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 606 (1976).
95. Three cases are currently pending disposition: Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F.
Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), appeal filed, 45 U.S.L.W 3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1977)
(No. 76-808) (New York education law prohibiting employment of aliens as public,
school teachers); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977), appeal
filed sub noin., Los Angeles County v. Chavez-Salido, 45 U.S.L.W. 2388 (U.S. May
17, 1977) (No. 76-1616) (Peace officer with state, county, or local government); Sur-
meli v. State of New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) aff'd 556 F.2d 560 (2d
Cir. 1976) cert. filed sub nom., Nyquist v. Surmeli, 45 U.S.L.W. 3588 (1977) (No.
76-1163) (physician's license).
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argued that all low level government employees are part and parcel of
the political process.9 6  Finally, this case violates the Court's own
principles, for it has stated, "Our standard of review of statutes that
treat aliens differently from citizens requires a greater degree of pre-
cision," 9 7 a precision nowhere to be found in the instant case.
Lauri Waldman*
96. Mr. Justice Rehnquist in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 661-62. At one
point, Rehnquist goes even farther than the rest of the Court by stating, "'Native-
born citizens (emphasis added) can be expected to be familiar with the social and
political institutions of our society; with the society and political mores that affect
how we react and interact with other citizens." Id. Up until the present time, he is
the only justice on the bench to move in such a direction.
97. Id. at 642.
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